

**EASA**  
**Safety Recommendation Reply**

Recommendation ITAL-2005-020 issued on 11/02/2009

<b>Subject:</b>	Accident to ATR-72-202, registration TS-LBB, on 06/08/2005, at Palermo (Sicily, Italy)
<b>Safety Recommendation:</b>	EASA, FAA and Tunisian DGAC to consider the possibility that all air transport operators perform a systematic check of the correspondence between P/Ns shown in the applicable IPC with information contained/recorded in software/databases generally used for spares management, with particular reference to components which directly influence the aircraft's operation and safety.
<b>Response:</b>	The Agency supports the safety recommendation and the attached Safety Information Bulletin (SIB) No. 2010-11, dated 16 April 2010, has been published. With the SIB, EASA recommends operators to perform a systematic check or have an established system to ensure the proper identification and applicability/interchangeability data between part numbers shown in the maintenance data and information contained/recorded in software/databases used for spares management.
<b>Status:</b>	Closed - Agreement



## EASA Safety Information Bulletin

**SIB No.:** 2010 - 11

**Issued:** 16 April 2010

**Subject:** **Component Configuration Control – Discrepancies between the Manufacturer’s Aircraft Configuration Data and Operators’ Spares Management Systems.**

**Ref. Publication:** ANSV Italy - Final report on ATR 72, TS-LBB, ditching off the coast of Capo Gallo (Palermo – Sicily) on August 6<sup>th</sup>, 2005.

**Description:** The final report issued by the Italian Accident Investigation Board (ANSV) after an ATR 72 accident highlighted that one of the contributing factors to the event was the non-correspondence between the Part Number (P/N) of Fuel Quantity Indicator (FQI) in the operator’s management and spares information system database and the P/N provided in the Type Certificate Holder’s aircraft configuration definition data (Illustrated Parts Catalogue - IPC). This had led to an incorrect part, a FQI for ATR 42, being fitted on the ATR 72, resulting in an erroneous fuel indication. The investigation revealed that operator’s spares management system showed incorrect applicability/ interchangeability. A final IPC check for the applicability of the FQI to the ATR 72 was not performed to ensure that the correct part was fitted.

**Recommendation:** EASA supports ANSV Recommendation, that operators perform a systematic check or have an established system to ensure the proper identification and applicability / interchangeability data between P/Ns shown in the maintenance data and information contained / recorded in software / databases used for spares management. EASA reminds operators that the approved maintenance data and the manufacturer’s configuration definition data must always be used when determining the component eligibility to be installed.

**Applicability:** All aircraft operators.

**Contact:** For further information contact the Airworthiness Directives, Safety Management & Research Section, Certification Directorate, EASA; E-mail: [ADs@easa.europa.eu](mailto:ADs@easa.europa.eu).

This is information only. Recommendations are not mandatory.